

NIGERIA'S OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION AND NIGER DELTA MILITANCY

Ademola Emmanuel Oluniyi

Department of Communication and General Studies, Peace and Strategic Studies (Unit)

Federal University of Agriculture, Abeokuta, Ogun State, Nigeria

E-mail: niyi_ademol@yahoo.com +234 8098611888

Abstract

Nigeria is the largest oil producing country in Sub-Saharan Africa, with 32% and 34.2% of Africa's oil and gas reserves respectively, the fifth largest exporting country in the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the largest oil exporting country to the US. This paper carries out exploratory survey of Nigeria oil and gas industry with focus on the incessant conflicts in the oil producing communities, as well as security, environmental problems and corruption that are ranking high among factors serving as impediment to national development and oil sector particularly. The work finds that communal conflicts, pipeline vandalization, kidnapping, sabotage, crude oil theft among other militant activities, are all militating against the country's economic growth and have posed greater challenges to the oil and gas industry; inversely impacting on upstream and downstream oil production. The sharp decline in national oil proceeds in the recent past, coupled with global drop in oil prices has given a final blow, and proved right that much hyped revenue from the famous black gold can no longer sustain Africa's largest economy. Suggestions are raised for restructuring the nation's dwindling oil and gas industry. Nigeria's economy needs to be weaned from its overdependence on the petro-dollar economy.

Keywords: Nigeria, oil and gas, sustainable development, militant, oil reliance

Introduction

Nigeria is the largest oil producer among the Sub-Saharan African States, with about 32 % and 34.2 % of Africa's oil and gas reserves respectively. Nigeria ranks among the top 10 nations in proven oil and natural gas reserves, worldwide. Nigeria estimated crude oil and natural gas reserves are 36.2 billion barrels and 181.9 trillion cubic feet (TCF); the fifth largest exporting country in the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the largest oil exporting country to the US (*Oil and Gas Journal* (OGJ), Nigeria is known as the largest producer of sweet oil in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (Iledare, 2007). It has the largest natural gas reserve in Africa, has the second largest oil reserve in Africa and is the African continent's primary oil producer. Since the late 80s, oil revenue provided 90% of Nigeria foreign exchange earnings and 85% of the government revenue (Odeyemi and Ogunseitan 1985), with estimated reserves extending beyond 20-30 years (NNPC, 1984). Shell D'Arcy, the pioneer oil company in Nigeria started commercial production of oil in 1958 with a production rate of 5100 barrels per day and a peak production of 2.44 million barrels per day over the next few years (Amu, 1982).

Nigeria's proven natural gas reserves are estimated at about 200 trillion cubic feet (TFC), about 2.82 per cent of global reserves and three times as substantial as oil reserves. As at 2010, Nigeria had become a major exporter of LNG to the EU and the US. Particularly coveted is the Bonny Island Liquefied Natural Gas

(LNG) plant, which has an annual output capacity of 17 million tons; an annual output of 2.5 million tons of liquefied petroleum gas (PLG) and a million tons per annum of condensates. New plants, such as Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) Project, Escravos Gas-Gathering Project and Oso Natural Gas Liquefied Project, are either currently operational or are in the pipeline (Ajayi, 2013). In 2011, while the NLNG exports to the US substantially declined, its exports to Japan more than tripled (USEIAN). Nigeria is, by far, the Gulf of Guinea's major oil and gas player with the Niger Delta as its epicenter, as already indicated. Between 2009 and 2011, the country earned \$ 143.5 billion in equity crude sales, royalty, signature bonuses and taxes. During the same period, it lost over 136 million barrels of oil estimated at \$109 billion to oil theft, militancy and sabotage. 10 million barrels valued at \$894 million were also lost as a result of pipeline vandalism in onshore operations (NEITI-EITI Core Audit Report of Oil and Gas, 2009-2011).

Nigeria has a long coast line towards the Atlantic Ocean lying between latitude 4°15' to 4°50' and longitude 5°25' to 7°37' with a land mass of about 28000sq/km area within the coastal region. The surface area of the continental shelf is 46300sq/km. The coastal areas consist of fresh water swamp, mangrove swamp, beach ridges, sand bars, lagoons, marshes and tidal channels. It has a total land mass of 923,768sq/km; 918,768sq/km being terrestrial land and 13000 sq/km being aquatic (CIA World Fact Book). The coastal area is humid with a mean average

temperature of 24-32°C and coastal area has an average annual rainfall ranging between 1,500-4,000mm (Kuruk, 2004). Anifowose (2008) and Onuoha (2008) in their studies affirmed that the Delta region of Nigeria which makes up the coastal area has about 606 oil fields with 355 situated onshore; 251 situated offshore with 5,284 drilled oil wells and 7,000km of oil and gas pipelines. There are several rivers that channel into the Atlantic Ocean directly, all other flowing waters flow into the Chad basin or into the lower Niger to the sea eventually (Kuruk, 2004).

Since the late 70s, Nigeria has four oil refineries with an estimated total refining capacity of 445,000 barrels per day (Onuoha, 2008; Anifowose, 2008). The first and oldest one, the Port Harcourt refinery, was commissioned in 1965. It had an initial capacity of 35,000 barrels per day, which was later expanded to 60,000 barrels per day of light crude oil. The Port Harcourt refinery has a second refinery with a capacity of 150,000 barrels per day (Odeyemi and Ogunseitan 1985; Ukoli 2005). These refineries today have gone moribund which has made Nigeria to have continued exporting its crude to the foreign refineries for many years. This process is found to have yielded more benefits to the political elite who are feeding fat under the politics of *oil* subsidy. However, it has been a bitter experience for Nigerian citizenry. Like many other oil producing countries, Nigeria has not been spared the agony over the years as a result of recurrent violent conflicts associated with exploration, production and the misappropriations of oil resource (Obi, 1997). By most accounts, Africa in general had been blessed with numbers of natural resources and Nigeria in particular, had witnessed an “unprecedented boom in oil production” (Southall, 2009). The extraction of oil by countries in Africa and other parts of the developing countries nevertheless has commonly led to political repression, corruption and violence” (Klare and Volman, 2006: 625).

In Nigeria, for example, following the post independence, and early 1967 oil related disputes, there had occurred insurrection by a major ethnic group in the Niger Delta Region, (the repository of almost all of the nation's oil and gas reserves) in Nigeria. Less than a year after, the nation experienced a civil war (the Biafra war of 1967-70) which was not unconnected with disagreements over sharing of oil revenues. While the country has managed to maintain a fragile post-war peace, since middle of 90's down to late 90's; there have been on going violence and uprising on oil resources with a renewal of the calls for self-determination and local control of oil resource by the agitators in the oil

producing areas, especially since inception of democratic government in 1999. Going by all these challenges, it is in no doubt that Nigeria has been on a struggle.

The failure to address the problems emanating from the oil resources in Nigeria has been a curse. It is no secret that global oil price collapse in the recent years has been felt keenly across Nigeria, while the declining revenue has threatened to slow the economy momentum. The industry has been plagued, over the years, by inefficiency, waste, oil theft and endemic corruption. It has built up a sordid reputation for under-reporting the country's oil and gas sales and revenues. For example, between 2005 and 2010, Nigeria's GDP at purchasing power parity more than doubled, yet its human capital and living standards leave much to be desired. By 2010, the proportion of people living in absolute poverty in Nigeria had risen to nearly 60 percent, up from 54.7 percent in 2004, according to the National Bureau of Statistics.

World Bank estimates that 80 percent of energy revenues benefit just one percent of the population. Starting from 2015, from global scene, the price of crude oil has continued to experience a downward trend. The price which stood at an average of \$112 per barrel in June 2014 slipped to \$35 per barrel in December, 2015, the price that was far below the budget benchmark of \$53 per barrel for year 2015 (Chika, 2016). The Nigerian economy has been substantially unstable, a consequence of the heavy dependence on oil revenue, and the volatility in the prices of oil. As at the mid-1970s, petroleum exploration and production had dominated the Nigerian economy, with this, Nigeria moved from an agricultural economy based on the export of palm oil, cocoa, and groundnuts to a petroleum economy based on crude oil extraction (Umoren,1984). As the Nigerian government focused its attention on the petroleum industry, the agricultural industry was neglected. Under-investment, a steady drift away from the land to urban centers, increased consumer preference for imported foodstuffs (particularly rice, wine and wheat) and outdated farming techniques continued to keep the level of food production well behind the rate of population growth. The country of over 160 million people, and giant of Africa today is forced to import food at high Western prices to feed its people, even to the level of domestic staples food such as: rice, garri, palm oil and beans.

Not only that the agricultural sector in Nigeria has been ignored over the years, but so has the industrial sector. Unlike many developing countries where the

agricultural based economy is replaced by a labor-intensive manufacturing industry, there were few industrial jobs to take the place of the disappearing agricultural development in Nigeria (Nwankwo,1982). Even as at 1995, manufacturing only accounted for only 5% of the GDP (Van Buren). The contraction of agriculture and manufacturing with the military structural adjustment policy (SAP) led to high unemployment and an increased sense of frustration. Unfortunately, while petroleum became the mainstay of the economy in terms of both export revenues and attracting foreign investments, it has never been influential in terms of employment for the Nigerian people (Wright, 1998). The oil boom had a crucial impact on domestic politics as revenues accrued to the federal government. The growth of oil revenues combined with and reinforced a trend towards the centralization of power by the military government. With the lack of other industries, state governments became dependent on the national government for funds, contributing heavily to the contraction of social services and inability of many states to pay their workers salary in the recent years.

The influx of wealth also contributed to rampant corruption, making Nigeria one of the most corrupt governments in the world. The country oil sector is regarded as one of the least transparent globally. In a 2010 survey of 44 National and International Energy Companies by the Revenue Watch Institution (RNI, 2010), the NNPC brought up the rear (Katsouris and Sayne, 2013). Corrupt officials have easy access to government funds and since the oil boom first began, millionaire generals have become common. There has been an estimated \$176 billion of unaccounted oil revenues during the 1980-1992 periods (Wright, 1998). The worse situation was the series of reports on misappropriation of oil surplus and oil money being lodged into different accounts of politicians by the past administrations. The oil boom of the 1970s which has been a follow up till late 90s led to the neglect of non-oil tax revenues, expansion of the public sector, decadence of infrastructures and deterioration in financial discipline and accountability.

Nigerian masses have become impoverished while handfuls of millionaires consume and spend (Nwankwo,1982). The hardship suffered at the hand of their political leaders irritated the groups of violently radicalized agitators especially from the oil-bearing communities of Niger Delta. In turn, oil-dependence exposed Nigeria to oil price volatility which threw the country's public finance into disarray. According to Sala-Martin and Subramanian (2003), Waste and

Dutch disease manifesting in rapid capital accumulation and negative Total Factor Productivity (TFP) characterized Nigeria's many years of political post-independence development experience. While capacity utilization averaged about 77 percent in 1975, it had declined to about 50 in 1983 and until very recently has languished at about 35 percent since the mid-1990s. Nigerian experience in oil and gas extraction and production has proved wrong the assertion by early 50s development economists especially, those who associated with the *staple theory of growth*; who have suggested that "natural resources abundance would help the backward states of Africa to overcome their capital pitfalls and provide revenue for their government to provide public goods, better development and lifts their citizens out of doldrums of poverty". In opposite, since late 90's, a growing number of resources conflicts have established a link between resource abundance and a number of socio-economic problems. Consequently, natural resources abundance in Nigeria and other oil producing African countries has been associated with various economic adversities.

The percentage of Nigerians living below the United Nations US\$1 per day absolute poverty line rose from 27 in 1980 to 66 in 1996, and 70 in 2000. At the same time, income distribution has deteriorated sharply with more and more people pushed towards poverty and towards extreme wealth. With a Gini index of 50.6 in 1996-97, Nigeria's richest 10 percent controls 40.8 percent of the country's wealth and the poorest ten percent only a negligible 1.6 percent (*CIA Fact Book, Nigeria, 200*). Nigeria Sub-Sahara Africa's largest oil producer has given a classical illustration of "national resources as development trap". Rich in proven resources approximately 30 billion barrels of oil and gas having earned an estimated \$340 billion over the past years, Nigeria oil exports rank only behind Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Iran and United Emirates. Her oil dependence accounts for 83% of export earnings and approximately 40% of GDP (Philips, 1997; Onosode,2003 and Imobigbe,2007).

Security threat and Nigeria's oil production


More fundamental problems are increased risk of security in the oil and gas producing communities of Delta region, Nigeria. Soysa, (2011); Donner, (2009); and Weszkalynys (2009, 2011) for instance blamed crude oil for the underdevelopment of oil-rich African states and the common denominators of instability and violence in those countries. According to the trio, the paradox of plenty in Africa is that the continent is rich, its people are poor- and in many cases extremely poor. Given that the Niger Delta brings in around 90 percent

of the country's foreign exchange earnings and 80 percent of government revenues, any threat to it automatically become a threat to Nigeria's economy as a whole.

An IMF report entitled *Boom, Bust, or Prosperity? Managing Sub-Saharan Africa's Natural Resource Wealth*. "Data from the sub-region suggests that such a curse has been present to some degree, but has diminished since 2000, although the broad economic and social indicators point to continued weaknesses that could be attributed to poor natural resource management." Africa, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa, and Nigeria in particular is making a good example of how abundant resources can stifle development and distracts government from the central task of ensuring long-term prosperity. With little incentive to raise taxes or focus on other sectors, plentiful resources have been known to cripple once-fruitful economies and shrink government responsibility. While the annual value of oil stolen from Nigeria estimated at between \$3 and \$8 billion dollars' pales into insignificance compared to \$550 billion, the annual value of drug sold globally (Book, 2013; Kat Souris and Syne, 2013), it is huge loss to Nigeria's ailing mono cultural economy. Obi's (2004) studies on globalization, oil industry and local community politics showed that globalization, oil local politics nexus is characterized by conflict relations arising from the mode of production, its exploration and production consequences. According to him, the global oil giants, the state and local authorities, elite's fractions seek to maximize oil extraction and optimize profit while on the other hand, the villagers who are disposed of their farmlands and fishing ground suffer the wide spread impact of oil pollution, environmental degradation and gas flaring. Eteng (1998) had arguably

explained that the potential benefits of links to the oil and gas industry have thus exacerbated conflicts within and among the oil producing communities.

It is interesting to note that the federal government had made some ameliorative attempts in addressing the conflicts disrupting the exploration of oil in the oil producing communities like: (i) the setting up of the Niger Delta Development Board NNDB in 1962 (ii) The Presidential Task Force on Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development 1989 (iii) Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission OMPADEC, 1992. The Niger Delta Development Commission NDDC 2000. Of these efforts and others, Okpeh (2004), notes that, these measures have not been able to address the core demand and agitation of the people largely because of the insincerity of the Nigerian State and its ruling elites. This culture of neglect breeds hostilities and violent reaction from oil and gas extracting communities. Oil losses on account of militancy are estimated at over \$1 billion annually. Commenting on the beginning of the drop in oil production in Nigeria, Tanimu (2009) noted that immediately after election, violence in the Niger Delta region dropped Nigeria's crude oil output by nearly one million barrel per day, plunging production to its lowest level since early 2003. Tracing the history downward, Onuoha (2016) asserted that in mid-2015, the insurgency resurfaced. Intensified attacks on oil infrastructure by new militant groups such as the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) have reduced Nigeria's output to a 22-year low. Data cited by RBC capital markets' showed by the commodities team revealed that Nigeria's oil production slipped to 1.69 million barrels as at first quarter of 2016, following the upsurge in pipeline vandalization in the volatile Niger delta region by the Niger Delta Avengers.



Source: CNBC, 2016

Data gathered from the Nigeria Extractive Transparency Initiative- NEITI revealed that Nigeria lost \$15.9 billion as result of crude oil theft, pipeline sabotage and deferred production in four years. The data covering 2011-2014 showed that a total volume of 38.6 million barrels of crude oil was lost in 2011, costing \$4.4 billion. Year 2012 for example had the second heaviest loss with 23.8 million barrels of crude oil lost amounting to \$2.7 billion. The NEITI figures also revealed that in 2013, the country witnessed the highest loss of 37.7 million barrels of crude oil, totaling \$4.7 billion. As at 2014, Nigeria lost 40.2 million barrels of crude oil amounting to \$4.1 billion. Total volume of crude oil lost was 140.3 million, amounting to \$15.9 billion from 2011 to 2014. The country's crude oil production declined by 12% in the third quarter of 2016 due mainly to militant attack in the Niger Delta.

The ongoing violence has also impacted maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. Pirate attacks emanating from the Niger Delta remain a major threat to the oil industry in Nigeria and merchant shipping in the GoG. An estimated 70 percent of all piracy-related incidents in the GoG are directly related to Nigerian criminal gangs, mostly originating from the Niger Delta. In the first quarter of 2016, at least 12 attacks were recorded in the Gulf of Guinea, including nine in Nigeria, one in Côte d'Ivoire, and two within the territorial waters of the DR Congo (Zerihoun, 2016). Apart from worsening the economic woe of Nigeria and the standard of living, crippling almost everything from oil production, export operations and power; it has affected economic relations of Nigeria as neighboring countries like Ghana are beginning to face certain challenge as a result of the attacks. Former Ghanaian president, John Mahama did blame Nigeria for the fitful power cuts in his country; and referred to delay in the delivery of crude oil to his country's power stations.

Nigerian crude oil and the need for diversification

The experiences of oil exporters across the globe shows that oil dependence is a perilous development path, making diversification a necessity. Norway has used the benefits from North Sea oil to earn the highest place on the UN human development rankings (Gary and Karl, 2003). Mexico and Malaysia have also fared well among developing oil exporters. Angola formally called the third biggest economy after South Africa and Nigeria has performed wonderfully well in the recent years with a GDP of over \$104 billion in 2011. This has been achieved as a result of FDI capital inflows into the country vast oil and gas industry (Amuwo, 2013).

Steady investment in the energy infrastructure since the end of the devastating 27 years of civil war (1975-2002) has gradually developed the sector. Taken as example, the official goal of the country's National Development Plan (NDP) 2013-2017, is to create a new Angola by giving priority to provide investment to diversify and create jobs. This is not the case in Nigeria. The Nigerian Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), described as "the first attempt to restructure the Nigerian oil industry to enforce sustainability, transparency and greater control over her natural resources" (Rasheed, 2011) is the country's boldest attempt since juridical independence in 1960 to make the industry truly serve national interest. But nearly ten years after it was first introduced in the National Assembly, it has yet to be passed into law and its contents have, by most accounts, been watered down. Among others, the Bill seeks to increase the royalties payable to the Nigerian state by the MNOCs and to determine the crude outputs at the points of production rather than at the points of export, the current practice. It also provides for the payment by oil majors of ten per cent of their oil earnings to the oil-bearing and producing communities.

A coalition of foreign and local interests which considers the Bill's provisions too radical has sought to frustrate its passage to law. Both the presidency and the National Assembly have been under intense pressure to either wholly jettison the bill or pass a hollowed-out version that will be inconsistent with its original intention. The Bill has also pitched the Nigerian government and oil majors against each other with the latter appearing to have the upper hand with the active support of their home governments. They want the *status quo* to remain because it is extremely skewed in their favor, insisting that "a contract is a contract that must be respected by all parties" (Rasheed, 2011).

Conclusion

There is need to fertilize our policies for there is clear evidence that Nigerian government has not fully harnessed the opportunities of endowed natural resources. Gas flaring has remained a bone of contention in Nigeria. Companies in Nigeria still flare about 17.2 billion cubic meter of natural gas per year. This wasted gas could be converted for domestic use for the benefit of all Nigeria citizens while much of these could also be exported to earn national revenue.

At the same time, there is need for diversification of the national economy to stop over dependence on oil. Over thirty-four states of Nigeria have commercially viable

mineral resources. The states can be compelled to take the bull by the horn and see to the proper harnessing of these available mineral resources.. This will definitely boost their earning internally generated revenues, boost food security in each state and reduce the rush and dependency on Abuja monthly allocation.

If Ghana could reduce her poverty by half through cocoa farming towards meeting the Millennium Development Goals of 2015-year target; and Angola could manage her oil largess for better industrial development with strong and improved gross domestic product; Nigeria should be able to do better and boost food security and improve her economy via investments in agriculture and its related value chains. Agriculture-based production could serve as a major way of discouraging militancy.

Lastly, there should be enforcement of fiscal responsibility and procurement laws at all levels for transparency and accountability.

Reference

- Abali, D. (1996). "Impact of oil on Nigeria's Foreign Policy." Essays on Nigerian Politics and Government; *Foreign Policy*: Vol. 1 No. 1.
- AFP, (2016). "Oil Attacks in Nigeria's South hit Power, Water Supply," 24 May 2016, www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3607403/Oil-attacks-Nigerias-south-hit-power-water-supply.html.
- Ajayi, O. (2013), "Nigeria", Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, March, 6pp (www.freshfields.com/uploaded/Files/SiteWide/News_Room/Insight/Africa_ENR/Nigeria)
- Amin, S. (2004). "The Alternative to the Neoliberal System of Globalization and Militarism: Imperialism Today and the Hegemonic Offensive of the United States" in Samir Amin, Mahmood Mamdani and Fatou Sow, *General Assembly Distinguished Lectures, Kampala 2002*, Dakar: CODESRIA, pp. 1-14
- Amu, L.A.O., 2006. "A Review of Nigeria's Petroleum Industry. NNPC, Lagos". Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), *Annual Reports*, Abuja (1997), Brest, France.
- Amuwo, „K. (2009a). "Towards a New Political Economy of the Niger Delta Question in Nigeria", *Politikon, South African Journal of Political Studies*, 36, 2, August, pp. 237-257
- Anifowose, B 2008. Assessing the Impact of Oil & Gas Transport on Nigeria's Environment. *U21 Postgraduate Research Conference Proceedings 1*, University of Birmingham UK.
- Awosika, L.F (1995). Impacts of global climate change and sea level rise on Coastal resources and energy development in Nigeria. In: Umolu, J.C., (Ed). *Global Climate Change: Impact on Energy Development* DAMTECH Nigeria Limited, Nigeria.
- Badmus, I.A. (2010). "Oiling the Guns and Gunning for Oil: Oil Violence, Arms Proliferation and the Destruction of Nigeria's Niger-Delta". *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences*.2(1):323- 363.
- Delano, F. (2007): "Working with partners to maximize investment potential." Presented at Nigeria Oil & Gas 2007 Abuja, Nigeria. February 7, 2007.
- Eseduwo, F.S. (2007). "Petroleum Prospecting, State Violence and Hostage-taking in Nigeria: A Study of the Niger Delta Region (1966-2007)" Unpublished M.sc Thesis Presented to the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka.
- Eteng, L.A. (1997). *The Nigeria State, oil exploration and community interest: issues and perspectives*. Port Harcourt: Port Harcourt University Press.
- Iledare, O.O (2007). "Oil and the Future of Nigeria: Perspectives on Challenges and Strategic Actions for Sustainable Economic Growth and Development". Presented at Center for Energy Studies; sponsored by International Association for Energy Economics, Abuja Nigeria.
- Iledare, O.O. (2004a). "Analyzing the impact of Petroleum Fiscal Arrangements and Contract Terms on Petroleum E&P Economics and the Host Government Take." Presented at the 2004 SPE Nigeria Annual Technical Conference and Exhibition held in Abuja, Nigeria. August 2-5, 2004.
- Katsouris, C. and Aaron S. (2013). *Nigeria's Criminal Crude: International Options to Combat the Export of Stolen Oil*, London: Chatham House, September
- Kuruk, P (2004). *Costomary Water Laws and Practices: Nigeria*

- <http://www.fao.org/legal/advserv/FOA/UCNCS.Nigeria.pdf> retrieved 11th May 2017
<http://www.fao.org/lega/advserv/Fao>.
- Capitalism”, in *A New Scramble for Africa*, pp. 357-385
- Matt T. (2016). “Nigeria urgently needs to tackle corruption and theft in its oil industry” *World finance, the voice of market*.
- NNPC, Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, *Monthly Petroleum Information*, September Lagos, Nigeria, 2009.
- NEITI-EITI Core Audit Report of the Oil and Gas, 2009-2011: Financial Audit: An Independent Report Assessing and Reconciling Financial Flows within Nigeria’s Oil and Gas Industry, 2009-2011
- Obi, C. (2011). “Democratising the Petro-State in West Africa: Understanding the Challenges”, in *Fuelling the World – Failing the Region*, pp. 102-120.
- Odeyemi, O. and Ogunseitan, O.A (1985). Petroleum Industry and its Pollution Potential in Nigeria. *Oil & Petroleum Pollution*, Elsevier Applied Science Publishers Ltd, England, 2: 223-229
- Onosode, G. (2003). *Environmental issues and the challenges of the Niger Delta: perspective from the Niger Delta*. Yaba: The CIBN Press Limited.
- Southall, R. and Alex C. (2009). “The Scramble for Africa and the Marginalisation of African
- Tanimu, Y. (2009). “Nigeria Realizing on the Gains of Amnesty”. <http://www.africanews.com>.
- Tarrow, S. (1998). *Power in Movement Social Movement and Contentious Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Umoren, J. (1984) *Democracy and Ethnic Diversity in Nigeria*. New York: University Press of America, Inc,
- Watts, M. (2007) “The Rule of Oil: Petro-Politics and the Anatomy of an Insurgency”. Paper Delivered to the “Oil and Politics” Conference, Goldsmiths College, University of London, May 10-11th.
- Weszkalyns, G. (2011) “Cursed Resources or Articulations of Economic Theory in the Gulf of Guinea”, *Economy and Society*, 40, 3, August, pp. 345-372
- Wright, S. (1998). *Nigeria: Struggle for Stability and Status*. Boulder Colorado: Westview Press,
- Zerihoun, T. (2016) “Open Debate of the Security Council on Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea in the Gulf of Guinea, Assistant Secretary-General,” United Nations Department of Political Affairs, 25 April ,www.un.org/undpa/en/speechesstatements/25042016/Piracy-Gulf-of-Guinea.